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When social scientists are calling for ‘affirmative critique’, one might think that 
humanity’s canaries have stopped singing. Environmental sociology, practice theory, 
the ‘new catastrophism’, and other future oriented social science approaches have 
only begun to influence global policy with their diagnoses of humanity’s failure to 
address the threat of a collapse of civilization around climate change, environmental 
degradation, anti-microbial resistance, violence and conflict. Yet, as political 
mechanisms like the Paris Climate Accord are choked by populism, some social 
scientists are promoting critique that ‘affirms’ survival.  
Affirmative critique makes radical demands, including calls for post-human 
disloyalty to our own species (Braidotti 2016), drastic forms of population control 
(Haraway 2016), and life in the ruins of capitalism and modernity (Tsing 2015). It 
might sound like swan song, but these forms of enquiry are creating unique 
momentum and hope for a revolution in ‘worlding’. In his last book, John Urry put 
forward a powerfully simple call to action, observing that ‘the future is now’ 
(2016:7).  
 
Figure 1 A copy of a 1968 Paris graffiti in Seattle.  
Image Source: OvO Reproduced under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 
He proposes ‘social futures’ thinking as a response to the world-shaping, future-
forming nature of social life in the present, highlighting the inherent ‘systemness’ of 
the everyday. This recognises that futures are social, firstly, because futures 
imagined and unfolding define people’s lives here and now as well as 
intergenerational relations. Secondly, it starts from the understanding that futures 
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in the Anthropocene are social because they are shaped by the accretions, 
excretions and exhalations of the social. It appreciates that everyday social and 
material practices of mobility, energy use, consumption, and communication have 
complex multi-scalar systemic ‘worlding’ effects with resonances to Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world system theory and critiques of global capitalism. Social futures 
are local, but also global, planetary, perhaps even interplanetary; they entangle 
inequalities, multiple pasts, presents and futures, the material and the 
technological, the human and the non-human.  
Most people ‘are unaware of the systemness of their daily practices’ (Urry 2016:73). 
But ‘the science is in’, showing that what the 7.5 billion people on the planet do 
every day, especially those in the global North, aggregates to reduce the earth’s 
capacity to support human flourishing (Urry 2016:38). Changing this systemic 
dynamic requires transdisciplinary science, but it is not a matter for science alone. 
John Urry’s What is the Future? sets out to ‘mainstream the future’, to engage 
diverse interests, knowledges, forms of expertise, creativity, and practice to 
envisage and contest what ‘good’ or ‘better’ futures might be, and to put into them 
now the things that might make them happen.   
It is not surprising that John Urry was at the vanguard of this newly emerging ‘social 
futures paradigm’. Like the ‘new mobilities paradigm’, ‘social futures’ thinking does 
not entail a complete departure from known theories and methods. Instead, it 
suggests a transformative shift in analytical imagination, perspective, values, 
practices, and politics. As Wells argued in 1906: ‘the creation of Utopias – and their 
exhaustive criticism – is the proper and distinctive method of sociology’ (cited in 
Levitas 2013: xi). Using utopia not as a blueprint of a perfect future (perfect for 
whom?), but as a method means that - like ‘mobilities’ – ‘futures’ constitute a 
diverse set of contested empirical phenomena and topics as well as a 
transdisciplinary analytical orientation and methodology, and contested ethical and 
political commitments. This convergence of the empirical, analytical, creative, 
ethical, and political resonate deeply with other – posthuman, feminist, 
cosmopolitan, participatory, designerly, artistic, phronetic, utopian, and affirmative 
– approaches, creating much synergy, but also some confusion. Some might say, 
with Peter Adey, that if futures are everything, they are nothing. But in a complex 
world proliferating intractable challenges, the very ‘indiscipline’ of mobilising utopia 
for social futures research could be empirically, theoretically, methodologically, 
ethically, and politically transformative of science and what it means for life on the 
planet.  
Dark matter, hidden wealth, and social energy 
If with the new mobilities paradigm, Urry and Sheller captured Bergson’s fact that 
‘reality is movement’, What is the future? captures the ontological futurity of the 
social and the sociality of futures, with resonances to Heidegger, Adams, Prigogine 
and many others. Complexity is a conceptual engine for this future-forming, 
‘affirmative’ critique.  
In my interpretation, complexity is key, because by acknowledging the multi-causal, 
non-linear dynamics of social change, a social futures approach turns the apparent 
oxymoron of affirmative critique into a catalyst for actionable research. Affirmative 
critique is not about agreeing with that which is being critiqued, but about acting on 
it with insight and – in Bruno Latour’s words - radically careful and carefully radical 
creativity, coupled with a commitment to ‘world’ or co-create alternatives by 
‘staying with the trouble’ (Haraway 2016). Critique becomes affirmative when the 
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public role of social research to be responsible here and now is understood to go 
beyond policy recommendations. It requires social research to become response-
able, to transpose or ‘mobilise’ conventional social research methods of listening 
and observing, alongside analysis of troubles, as well as an articulation of responses 
to troubles and public experiment with such responses.  
These methodologies are not unique to the new social futures paradigm, but derive 
new energy from John Urry’s observation of the ‘dark matter, hidden wealth, and 
social energy’ of lived social change, everyday creativity and social innovation. In 
What is the Future?, he argues that capitalism, progress, and technology may ‘bend 
humans to their character’, but that social ‘structures of feeling’ are a powerful 
source of resistance (Urry 2016:12). They are ‘dark matter’ that can effect tectonic 
shifts in complex socio-economic orders (Urry 2016: 35). Wealth hidden away from 
the collective good through offshoring may have unhinged democracy and truth, but 
at the same time, people live de-growth alternatives in the cracks, leveraging a 
‘hidden wealth’ of good social interactions, wellbeing and low-carbon lives (Urry 
2016:179). And the way in which high mobility sociability burns energy is 
counteracted by a ‘social energy’ that delivers communities from the fast lanes of 
high carbon into slow living, from land-use into land stewardship and car free city 
movements (Urry 2016:181). Social futures thinking and co-creating of research 
around such alternatives amplifies the dark energy of the social stored in these 
hopeful prefigurative phenomena, and could tip humanity from hurtling towards 
collapse into a good life in the ruins of capitalism, modernity, and risk.  
What could such futures look like? I will briefly sketch some contours taking shape in 
disaster risk management, where a hidden wealth of social interactions, and 
collective social energy give lived detail to these desire-lines of hope. 
Beyond Control  
People are unaware of the systemness of their daily practices, even if it has 
disastrous consequences. For example, ‘[n]o wars or terrorist attacks currently 
cause anything like’ the ‘toll of death, pain and injury’ of road traffic with its 1.25 
million deaths a year worldwide (Urry 2016:131). Yet, locked in to automobility 
systems, most people do not reflect upon, let alone act, to change their role in the 
production of such systemic disasters. Since Immanuel Wallerstein’s World System 
Theory, Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents, Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society, and Sheila 
Jasanoff’s Learning from Disaster, we know that geo-political and socio-technical 
systems are risky beyond human control, for some more so than others. John Urry’s 
work on complexity and mobilities has been pivotal to show how multiple forms of 
mobility and mobility systems are interconnected in this unequally risky runaway 
world. Many proliferate dangerous im|material im|mobiles such as air or water-
borne micro-particles and plastics, climate altering greenhouse gases, nuclear 
radiation, and anti-microbial resistant bacteria. And there are digital and cultural 
im|material im|mobiles that cause trouble, too. Data has become Kafka-esquely 
noxious, erratically splintering freedom, tolerance, equality, social solidarities and 
values in surveillant assemblages, while cultural memes circulate, infiltrate and 
shape cultural politics of (un)truth and emotion that inhibit understanding of 
systemness and risks. 
However, people are unaware of the disastrous systemness of their everyday 
practices not just due to its im|material im|mobile complexities, or their ignorance, 
apathy, or susceptibility to manipulation. Unawareness of systemness is also actively 
produced by modern discourses of disaster risk ‘management’ and ‘security’. They 
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are couched in metaphors of command and control. The modern myth of human 
mastery over nature is durable. Even though unknowability and uncertainty are 
widely recognised as intrinsic to risk, difficulties in preventing or responding to 
disasters are regularly traced back to a ‘data gap’. Post-disaster reports routinely 
blame a lack of information, inadequate organisational, legal, and technological 
interoperability, and social, cultural, or political reluctance to share information for 
failures. A clamour for more and more free-flowing data, better networks, 
visualization and communication technologies drowns quieter calls to work with 
more humility and respect for the incalculability of risk.  
For example, Rana Novack, founder of the Refugee Admissions Network Alliance 
reacted angrily to the 2015 refugee crisis, writing in Wired magazine in 2015: ‘We 
should have seen this refugee crisis coming … we have the technology—right here, 
right now—to create a new, agile, insightful model that will predict mass 
migrations’. This is one of myriad calls for more data and data sharing that sound 
hollow in view of the fact that, very often, ‘we’ already know.  
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and 
other agencies routinely monitor the movement of people. UNHCR figures readily 
available in 2015 showed that the number of people displaced by conflict and 
persecution had increased dramatically by 8.3 million in 2014, to a total of 59.5 
million in 2015 (65.6 at the time of writing). And this is just a small section of the 
total number of people on the move across borders worldwide at 244 million.  
Risks, such as conflict, drought, or famine undermine human security and underpin 
migration. Their systemness and connection between global everyday practices and 
these vast numbers of people on the move is extremely complex (see Figure 2). But 
it is not not seen because there is no data or analysis. The International Organization 
for Migration, for example, has developed a contextual and strategic data collection 
capacity on the nexus of crisis and mobility, by continuously tracking the movement 
of people through its Displacement Tracking Matrix. However, discourses of security 
or command and control, and calls for ‘Big’ data veil a social and political 
unwillingness to acknowledge how the privileges of the few are on the same map as 
the suffering of the many. 
A new Structure of Feeling 
But a new structure of feeling is emerging around people’s experience of the politics 
of command-and-control-based disaster risk management reasoning. The ‘we’ in 
Rana Novack’s ‘we have the technology’ is no longer confined to formal disaster risk 
management agencies and expert analysts. People affected by risk have 
appropriated these technologies in quite different, less modern ways that open up 
new possibilities for new forms of systemness awareness.  
Prompted by post-election violence in Kenya in 2007, the Kenyan Ory Okolloh set up 
the Ushahidi crowdsourcing platform, and designed it to allow Kenyans to report 
election violence and share information. In an environment where a government 
ban on live media reporting and self-censorship severely curtailed people’s ability to 
know about the troubled election process, this was transformative beyond Kenya’s 
borders. Ushahidi enabled people affected to report crises and needs with such ease 
that it prompted a group of people affected by the 2010 Haiti earthquake, in 
collaboration with ‘digital humanitarians’ gathering around Patrick Meier, a PhD 
student at Boston University, to set up the ‘Ushahidi Haiti Project’. This allowed 
Haitians to submit situation reports and register their communities’ needs in a way 
that was very direct and easy (provided one had access to a mobile phone), and it 
 5 
involved recruitment of a global ‘task force’ of supporters to translate, geo-
reference, and parse the messages for visualization on a map. This passionate first 
mobilisation of ‘digital humanitarians’ was by no means unambiguously positive, but 
it did provide information that was used by formal emergency response agencies to 
prioritize rescue missions. Since then, Ushahidi has reached over 25 million people 
in crisis in over 120,000 different deployments. Two of the most recent deployments 
brought it full circle, first (with some irony) to the 2016 American elections, and 
then back to Kenya in 2017, where over 1600 issues of election disturbances were 
reported. This latest deployment has also brought it into close contact with quite 
different, manipulative ‘psychographic’ uses of data by ‘election management 
agencies’ like Cambridge Analytica. 
Similarly conflicting intersections of crowdsourced and surveillant ‘intelligence’ are 
emerging in relation to refugee journeys. Websites, such as 
www.appsforrefugees.com, index a boom in the ‘datafication’ of refugee mobilities. 
This is a highly contested field, with benefits for refugees who can access and share 
information more easily through these apps, but who also become more trackable 
and controllable through the way in which data is shared in surveillant assemblages 
of security and crisis response agencies. At the same time, crowdsourcing and data 
visualisation platforms like Max Galka’s ‘Metrocosm’ or ‘Our World in Data’, 
supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are beginning to visualise the 
systemness of migration through comparing socioeconomic variables for 167 
countries alongside analysis of country-to-country net migration (Figure 2) and by 
addressing the question ‘Does Development Reduce Migration?’ in the context of 
data about global inequality, extreme poverty, and environmental issues.  
 
Figure 2: Visualisation of global distribution of personal wealth and country-to-country net 
migration – Max Galka, reproduced with permission http://metrocosm.com/permissions/. 
These are examples of how ‘ordinary’ people are increasingly turning to social media 
platforms to document, debate, organise, and contest disaster risk management. A 
closer look at an example will allow us to trace some possibilities (and obstacles) for 
new forms of systemness awareness emerging from these bottom-up movements.  
When, in the spring of 2011, the Japanese government failed to make 
measurements about radiation from the meltdown at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear 
power plant available, and even tried to raise the thresholds for harmful radiation, 
some people self-organised grass-roots radiation measuring communities such as 
Safecast (https://blog.safecast.org). They bought Geiger counters, and, when they 
could not obtain them, shared knowledge online to learn how to build them; they 
measured radiation in their local environments, and shared the data online, 
constructing maps of the effects of Fukushima’s meltdown (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 Safecast Map with entries of measurements and observations. Source: 
http://safecast.org/tilemap/?y=37.92&x=140.38&z=7&l=0&m=0 [Screenshot taken 24 June 2017]. Reproduced 
under Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike License https://blog.safecast.org/faq/licenses/. 
One day after Safecast published its maps, the Japanese government released its 
first maps, highlighting the political power of self-organised citizen sensing to force 
the hand of authorities. Moreover, the Safecast map differs starkly from these 
official maps, which showed areas of contamination risk as roughly concentric rings, 
where the risk diminished linearly the farther away from the nuclear plant one 
moved on the map. The crowdsourced Safecast map, in contrast, shows complex 
micro patterns of contamination along roads and shipping routes, in areas where 
people live and work, and children play, as well as areas of agricultural production. 
In a 2011 article entitled ‘The Map is the Debate’, Jean Christophe Plantin describes 
how the communication and collaboration involved in producing the Safecast map 
constituted a public experiment, and a new way of sensing systemness and 
precarity. It did so by engaging people in experimenting with new ways of making 
(sense of) disaster risk. Quoting Noortje Marres, Plantin argues that ‘the 
introduction of new techno-scientific objects to society involves much more than 
the addition of new knowledge and things to social life. It requires the 
reconfiguration of the wider social-material relations among which the new object is 
to be accommodated’ (Marres 2009, quoted in Plantin 2011: 12). One such 
reconfiguration is a decrease of trust in governmental data and a growth of citizen 
sensing projects not just in Japan. Over 1000 Safecast Geiger Counter kits have been 
bought in more than 90 countries and more than 65 million measurements have 
been submitted. Another reconfiguration is Germany’s decision to decomission all 
its nuclear power stations after the Fukushima accident.  
Positioned at different points of privilege, the people affected by the Fukushima 
disaster in Japan, the German population, politicians, and anti-nuclear campaigners, 
refugees, analysts and visualisers of the systemness of forced displacement and 
migration seem to share a visceral awareness that ‘precarity is the condition of our 
time’, and they are asking ‘What if the time is ripe for sensing precarity?’ (Tsing 
2015:20). But they are also asking if it is time to sense precarity themselves and in 
its systemness. These are no smooth utopia of grassroots infrastructuring for human 
security. However, they change how people inhabit risky worlds and understand 
systemness. It is beyond the scope of this short essay to specify the altered 
phenomenologies, ontologies, social practices, ethics, and politics this generates, 
but perhaps enough of the ‘hidden wealth’ of good socio-material interactions has 
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become visible to jog the sociological imagination for social futures research that 
intervenes with ‘affirmative critique’ in these dynamics. 
To Conclude 
To conclude briefly, I would like to share a personal memory. At one of the first 
meetings of the team that set up the Institute for Social Futures at Lancaster 
University, one by one we went around the room. Each of us stepped up to a 
whiteboard and drew (with more or less skill) a picture of their motivation for, and 
contribution to, the new social futures paradigm (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 John Urry at the Institute for Social Futures, Lancaster University. 
When it was his turn, John didn’t know what to draw (he was not keen on creative 
methods). He laughed and, in the course of what I recall as a beautiful moment of 
intense intellectual sociability, he drew a frame around everything: a perfect capture 
of his most extraordinary skill as a map-maker, charting troubled socialities with 
such diagnostic vision and clarity, his great conceptual creativity, foresight, ethical 
and political commitment. His public sociology of complexity, mobilities and social 
futures is the best footing I know for affirmative critique, for putting the map to use 
to make a better futures, in interdisciplinary and collectively engaging, experimental 
ways. 
References 
Braidotti, R. (2016). Posthuman Critical Theory. In D. Banerji and M. R. Paranjape 
(Eds.), Critical posthumanism: planetary futures (pp. 13–32). New Dheli: 
Springer India. 
Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the trouble: making kin in the Chthulucene. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Levitas, R. (2013). Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Plantin, J.-C. (2011). “The Map is the Debate”: Radiation Webmapping and Public 
Involvement During the Fukushima Issue. In Proceedings of A Decade in 
Internet Time: OII Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society. 
21 - 24 September 2011, University of Southampton.  
Tsing, A. L. (2015). The mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in 
capitalist ruins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Urry, J. (2016). What is the future? London: Routledge. 
